Ronald Muth v. Dennis Woodring by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-15-2016 
Ronald Muth v. Dennis Woodring 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Ronald Muth v. Dennis Woodring" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 1188. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/1188 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 






UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 DENNIS A. WOODRING; JEFFREY M. SHRIVER;  
 CITY OF HARRISBURG, PA; DAUPHIN COUNTY, PA; 
 STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY 
 
    Jeffrey M. Shriver, 
          Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 1-14-cv-01798) 
District Judge:  Hon. Yvette Kane 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed November 15, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 




                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




JORDAN, Circuit Judge.  
 Jeffrey Shriver, a detective with the Harrisburg Bureau of Police, appeals the 
partial denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint brought against him by Albert Muth. 
The complaint alleges, among other things, that Shriver violated Muth’s constitutional 
rights, and therefore is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because Shriver maliciously 
prosecuted Muth for several felonies.  Shriver argued in his motion to dismiss that he was 
entitled to qualified immunity.  For the reasons discussed below, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order to the extent it denied Shriver’s motion and remand the matter for 
further consideration. 
I. Background 
 Muth owned a rental property in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, that 
was damaged by fire.  Shriver investigated the fire and deemed it suspicious.  Four 
months after the fire, Shriver filed three state law felony charges against Muth.1  Attached 
to the charging form was Shriver’s affidavit of probable cause supporting the enumerated 
charges.  Based on that affidavit, a warrant was issued and the Pennsylvania State Police 
promptly arrested Muth at work and took him to be arraigned.  He was released on a 
$50,000 unsecured bond and was subject to nonmonetary bail conditions.     
 Three years after Shriver filed the charges and probable cause affidavit, the 
Commonwealth filed an application for nolle prosequi, abandoning Muth’s prosecution 
on all charges.  Muth subsequently filed this federal civil action against Shriver, another 
                                              
 1 Muth was charged with (1) Arson Endangering Persons (Felony 1), 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3301(a)(1)(I); (2) Causing or Risking Catastrophe (Felony 3), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3302(b); and (3) Insurance Fraud (Felony 3), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4117(a)(2).     
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investigator, his insurance company, and Dauphin County.  His principal allegation is 
that the defendants acted, both jointly and individually, to violate his Fourth Amendment 
right against unlawful seizure, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, by engaging in malicious prosecution.   
 Various defendants, including Shriver, filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  In his motion, Shriver asserted that Muth had failed to 
adequately claim any violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court granted the motion 
to dismiss in part, but it did not dismiss the malicious prosecution count against Shriver.  
This timely appeal followed. 
II. Discussion2 
 Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law.  “We 
[thus] exercise plenary review over the District Court’s qualified immunity rulings.”  
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 643 F.3d 60, 69 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 Qualified immunity is not merely immunity from liability, but rather immunity 
from suit, operating to free the recipient from the burdens of litigation.  Plumhoff v. 
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014).  Because of that, the Supreme Court and our cases 
have “stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible 
stages of litigation.”  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Hunter 
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).  Here, the District Court properly considered 
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the denial of qualified immunity is an immediately 
appealable order.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
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Shriver’s qualified immunity at the threshold of litigation, before discovery, in the 
context of a motion to dismiss.  The Court did not, however, complete the analysis. 
 When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged 
inquiry. The first prong probes whether the allegations, “[t]aken in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer’s conduct violated a 
[federal] right[.]”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  The second prong asks 
“whether the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.”  Kelly v. Borough 
of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d. Cir. 2010).  The focus is on whether the law, at the 
time of the challenged incident, is sufficiently clear to “provide[] fair warning to the 
defendants that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.”  Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 
1861, 1866 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It is the defendant 
official’s burden to establish that he is entitled to qualified immunity.  Kopec v. Tate, 361 
F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004).     
 We have recognized that courts are free to examine the two prongs of the qualified 
immunity analysis in either order.  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 253-54.  For efficiency, a court may 
elect to consider the “clearly established” prong first because, if that prong is not 
satisfied, then qualified immunity applies.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 
(2009).  In that circumstance, no conclusion is made about the constitutionality of the 
officer’s conduct.  Id. at 241 (noting that resolving a case solely on the basis of the 
clearly established prong is consistent with the principle of constitutional avoidance)  
 If, however, a court elects to first consider whether the conduct violated a 
constitutional right, then both prongs of the test must be completed to determine if 
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qualified immunity applies.  See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (explaining that the “‘driving 
force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that 
‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery” 
(citation omitted) (first alteration in original)). 
 In this instance, the District Court proceeded by first considering whether Muth 
had pleaded a legally sufficient case for malicious prosecution such that his Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated.  The Court said that “the allegations of Plaintiff’s 
amended complaint suffice to state a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to Section 
1983 … .”  (App. at 26a.)  But it then explained that it had not reached “a definitive 
determination that Defendant Shriver violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights[.]”  (App. at 
26a.)  It is not clear, therefore, whether the Court completed the first prong of the 
qualified immunity inquiry.   
 Regardless, the District Court should not have reached a decision on Muth’s 
motion to dismiss without completing the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis.3  Even if Muth had plausibly claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights, the Court should have still considered whether, “in light of the specific context of 
the case,” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 
543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)), Shriver would have been on notice that his actions were 
unlawful.  Failing to do so was error and requires us to return this matter to the District 
Court. 
                                              
 3 We take no position on whether qualified immunity should apply. 
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III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order to the extent it  
denied Shriver’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and will remand the case for additional 
proceedings to fully evaluate whether Shriver is entitled to qualified immunity. 
